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reasoned that to find otherwise required an adjacent landowner to file
suit within three years from any pumping of groundwater from
adjoining lands in case such pumping caused future damage.
Alternatively, Stephen City argued that the English Rule, not the
American Rule, applied for dealing with legal rights and liabilities of
subterranean water. The English Rule permitted a landowner
unlimited exploitation of the water beneath his land. The American
Rule permitted the owner of surface land to make reasonable use of
subterranean percolating waters, but prohibited unreasonable
withdrawal for sale or distribution for uses not connected with the
beneficial use and enjoyment or ownership of the land. Defendants
argued that pursuant to section 1-10 of the Code of Virginia, the
Common Law of England applied unless overruled by statute or found
repugnant to the principals of the Bill of Rights and Constitution of
the Commonwealth. Therefore, the English Rule was applicable
because the Virginia legislature never modified the English Rule.
The court reviewed the history of section 1-10 and the English
Rule, recognizing that most states rejected the English Rule.
Precedent established that if the question of whether the English or
American Rule would be adopted in Virginia rose again, the court
would address it "de novo." However, the court stated it was too
premature to reach a definitive answer in this action.
The court stated it would require a substantial showing that the
English Rule was consistent with the peculiar needs and requirements
of Virginia as it approaches the twenty-first century. Additionally, the
court provided guidance to counsel in the presentation of their case.
The court noted that prudence dictated the case be tried on the
assumption that the rule requiring the most substantial amount of
evidence would apply. Therefore, the American Rule, requiring proof
of unreasonable amounts of water, methods of extraction, failure to
take remedial steps, and/or sale of water off premises was applicable.
Elaine Soltis

WASHINGTON
Skokomish Indian Tribe v. Fitzsimmons, 982 P.2d 1179 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1999) (holding Department of Ecology action arbitrary and
capricious by failing to object to Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission licensing where project was substantially noncompliant
with state law).
On November 15, 1974, the City of Tacoma applied to the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") for licensing of the
Cushman Dam Project ("Project"). The proposed project would
balance the designated uses with the public health and safety concerns
of the flood prone Skokomish River. The Skokomish Indian Tribe
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("Tribe") actively participated in the proceedings as an interested
party.
Part of the licensing process required FERC to determine whether
the proposed project comported with the Coastal Zone Management
Program ("CZMP") of the state. The city's licensing application
submitted to FERC included a "consistency certification" stating the
project complied with Washington's CZMP. The federal Coastal Zone
Management Act ("CZMA") required a state or designated agency to
concur or object to this "consistency certification" within six months.
Concurrence is conclusively presumed if the state fails to respond by
the deadline. The Washington Department of Ecology ("DOE") had
until May 30, 1997 to concur or object to the city's 'consistency
certification.'
On May 7, 1997, the DOE issued a letter constituting the agency's
'formal action.' This letter admitted that the proposed project failed
to comply with the requirements of Washington's Coastal Zone
Program. However, citing the already exorbitant amount of time the
project had taken to license, and the likely gridlock an objection
would cause, the agency determined that the purpose of the program
is served better by declining to take any action; therefore, it expressly
declined to object.
FERC issued the license for the project on May 30, 1997. On June
5, 1997, the Tribe filed a petition for review of the agency's May 7"
letter. On May 1, 1998, the district court dismissed the Tribe's petition
for review, holding that even if jurisdiction existed, the case was moot
because the State's opportunity to object had passed with the
expiration of the six-month review period and FERC's issuance of the
license. The Tribe appealed.
On appeal, the DOE argued that because the state court could not
order FERC to rescind the city's license, the court could provide no
'effective relief and, therefore, the Tribe's petition was moot. The
Tribe responded, and the court of appeals agreed, that armed with a
state court judgment, the Tribe could compel FERC to reopen the
Project's application. Reevaluation of the licensing decision required
FERC to consider whether its decision complied with the CZMP.
Upon reconsideration and exhaustion of administrative remedies, the
Tribe could then seek review of the agency's decision in federal court.
Thus, the state court could provide "effective relief' on the Tribe's
petition.
Washington's Shoreline Management Act ("SMA") appointed the
DOE the state's representative in actions involving FERC, and directed
the DOE to take "all reasonable steps necessary" to preserve the
integrity of the state's SMA policies. This court found that DOE's
letter declining to take action under CZM authority constituted, in its
own words, "formal agency action," opening it to the scrutiny of the
court. Taking this action under review, the court held that the DOE's
decision to acquiesce without regard to the acknowledged
noncompliance directly undercut the policies the agency was meant to
preserve and thus, was arbitrary and capricious. The court reversed
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the lower courts decision and remanded with directions to the DOE to
issue a new letter in response to the city's "consistency certification"
which comported with state law and accurately and affirmatively stated
DOE's concurrence or objection to the city's certification.
John B. Ridgley

WISCONSIN
Milam v. Wisconsin Dep't of Natural Resources, No. 98-1585, 1999 WL
391577 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the Wisconsin Department
of Natural Resources properly denied the Milams' request for the
water quality certification necessary to fill a wetland on their property
in order to construct residential housing).
James and Herminia Milam owned seventeen lots on which they
wanted to construct a subdivision. Three of the lots contained a
wetland totaling three-quarters of an acre. The Milams applied to the
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") for a water
quality certification to fill the wetland. According to the Wisconsin
Code, the DNR must consider practicable alternatives to the proposed
property use, which will not adversely affect the wetland or create
significant adverse impacts. The DNR's wetland/water management
specialist denied the application because a practicable alternative to
filling the wetland existed and filling would cause adverse impacts.
The specialist proposed combining four lots into two larger lots and
building homes on the upper portions of the two plots that did not
encompass the wetland area. This created fifteen residential units, as
opposed to the original seventeen. The Milams requested a contested
case hearing before an administrative lawjudge ("ALJ").
The ALJ found the DNR properly denied the Milams' request for
the water quality certification. The ALJ held the Milams had not
demonstrated the absence of practicable alternatives and the filling of
the wetland would result in detrimental impacts to its functional
values. The circuit court affirmed the decision.
The issue before the appellate court was whether substantial
evidence supported the ALJ's determination. The court of appeals
reviewed only the decision of the ALJ, not that of the circuit court. The
ALJ determined a practicable alternative to filling the wetland existed.
The court stated that a practicable alternative included one which
considered cost, available technology, and logistics in light of the
overall project purposes. The ALJ determined that fifteen of the lots
contained developable land for the purpose of residential
development. Clearly, the alternative allowed the construction of
houses on the residential lots with only two less than the Milams'
original plan. The court also found substantial evidence supporting
the ALJ's environmental impact determination because the specialist

